Caspar Leinen—Richard Mattinger: courtroom opponents and senior mentor

Caspar Leinen and Richard Mattinger are professional opponents in the Hans Meyer murder case, but Mattinger also becomes an important source of guidance to the young defense lawyer. Their relationship moves from a private discussion of professional responsibility to a public contest over how the court should understand the evidence, the victim, and Fabrizio Collini’s motive.

First Encounter and the Withdrawal Petition

Their first substantial exchange takes place in the lawyers’ common room at the Moabit Criminal Court, a private space where counsel discuss cases and advise one another. Caspar Leinen, crossing the room while reading the file, collides with another lawyer and drops papers. He apologizes, gathers them, and then notices Richard Mattinger reading newspapers on a sofa. Leinen introduces himself as counsel appearing in the same trial, the case concerning Fabrizio Collini and Hans Meyer.

The encounter quickly turns from introductions to a difficult professional decision. Leinen tells Mattinger that he is trying to withdraw from Collini’s defense. He had put his name on the roster of court-appointed counsel, but now believes that he cannot continue because of what has happened in the case. Having explained the circumstances, he gives Mattinger a copy of his petition. Mattinger reads it and acknowledges that Leinen has expressed himself well and that his position is understandable. His reservation is practical: under the law, withdrawal from court-appointed representation requires a breakdown in the relationship of trust between lawyer and client, and the presiding judge is strict about applying that rule.

Advice on the Duty to Defend

Mattinger identifies the personal history behind Leinen’s hesitation: Leinen practically grew up in the Meyer family. Rather than treating that connection as an automatic reason to abandon the case, Mattinger argues that it is not enough, by itself, to relieve Leinen of his responsibility. He warns that a defense lawyer will encounter many cases that touch personal feelings or provoke strong dislike, and that such reactions cannot decide whether a client receives a defense.

His advice is specific. Leinen should tell Collini about his relationship with the victim and ask whether Collini still wants him to act as counsel. If the client agrees, Mattinger says, the decisive obligation is to do his best and present the case as ably as he can. The point is not that Leinen made no mistake by accepting the appointment; Mattinger concedes that he may have done so. Rather, the mistake is now Leinen’s responsibility, not Collini’s. Mattinger’s counsel therefore places the client’s dependence on his lawyer above the lawyer’s wish to escape an emotionally difficult case.

This is the relation’s clearest mentoring moment. Mattinger is more experienced, recognizes that this is Leinen’s first major murder trial, and offers guidance without taking the decision away from him. The advice also anticipates the role reversal at the heart of their later exchanges: the lawyer who urges Leinen to remain in the case becomes the opponent whose advocacy he must meet.

Opponents in the Courtroom

During the early days of the trial, Mattinger demonstrates how effectively he can shape a courtroom’s understanding of evidence. While questioning Professor Wagenstett, he asks about the forensic findings in plain language and requests explanations whenever technical terminology might obscure their meaning. The evidence is presented through photographs and detailed questions; Mattinger’s controlled manner, rather than raised voices or theatrical gestures, allows the listeners to form a stark impression of the killing. Leinen recognizes that Mattinger is relying on that impression to influence the judges.

After Leinen presents Collini’s account of the past, Mattinger responds by contesting the moral frame of the defense. He argues that Collini’s father was shot on Meyer’s orders, but that if the shooting was legally permissible under the law then in force, Collini’s motive must be viewed differently. He also insists that the accessory prosecution has a duty to protect the victim, and identifies Hans Meyer—not Collini—as the victim in the case before the court. The argument turns the trial’s focus: Mattinger does not merely dispute Leinen’s account but challenges the place it gives Meyer within that account.

The Contest over Meyer’s Record

Mattinger’s most pointed courtroom intervention uses Dr Sybille Schwan’s testimony to emphasize that proceedings against Meyer were discontinued. He asks whether Meyer was ever questioned, then draws attention to the fact that investigations had taken place but Meyer had not been charged or convicted. After Schwan confirms that the Stuttgart Public Prosecutor’s Office discontinued the proceedings on 7 July 1969, Mattinger thanks her and ends his questioning. At that moment, he has succeeded in presenting Meyer as a man whose guilt was not established through prosecution, rather than as the murderer described in the press and by the defense.

Leinen immediately reopens the issue by asking who had brought the accusation against Meyer. Schwan identifies Collini. That answer changes the courtroom’s understanding: the judges had not known that Collini had reported Meyer to the authorities, and Mattinger’s face pales. Leinen then draws out the sequence: Collini named the man he believed responsible for his father’s death, supplied evidence, and trusted the authorities, only to receive notice that the proceedings were discontinued under a law that had come into force on 1 October 1968. The contrast is central to their conflict. Mattinger stresses the formal outcome of the discontinued investigation; Leinen makes the manner of that outcome—and Collini’s prior effort to seek legal redress—part of the evidence about motive.

Mutual Recognition and Continuing Conflict

Their relationship retains a measure of professional respect. After an early courtroom exchange, Mattinger touches Leinen’s forearm, tells him he has done well, and turns to face reporters, declining to comment before the trial is over. The gesture acknowledges Leinen’s performance even as their adversarial work continues. It does not dissolve their opposition: later, Mattinger tries to keep Leinen’s questions within the bounds of the criminal proceedings, while Leinen argues that the history of the discontinued case bears directly on guilt because it helps distinguish an arbitrary killing from an understandable motive. The presiding judge allows the inquiry on that basis.

The contrast between the two lawyers is therefore not simply between an inexperienced defender and a formidable opponent. Mattinger teaches Leinen that personal attachment cannot replace the duty to represent a client; Leinen’s eventual advocacy gives that principle force by bringing Collini’s earlier recourse to the law into view. Their courtroom rivalry becomes a contest over what legal procedure can establish and what it may leave concealed. The novel’s later note that it served as a reference point when a committee was appointed in January 2012 to reappraise the Ministry of Justice’s Nazi past extends that question beyond the fictional courtroom, but the relation between Mattinger and Leinen is where the competing accounts of responsibility are made visible.